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ABSTRACT
Defenders of strong intellectual property rights often maintain that
intellectual property infringement is theft and that the sanctions associated with it
ought to be high. Others are skeptical of the property comparison and think that
much lower sanctions are appropriate. In this Article, we argue that a careful
analysis demonstrates: 1) that intellectual property infringement can be
analogized to a property crime, but 2) that the more analogous crime is
vandalism or trespass rather than theft. This categorization takes the rhetorical
punch out of the property comparison.
In addition to analyzing the natures of the various offenses, this Article
investigates the sanction regimes for different property violations and finds that
not only are maximum statutory sanctions generally higher for intellectual
property infringement than for vandalism and trespass, but they are also usually
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higher than for theft. Bringing intellectual property infringement in line with
property offenses, therefore, would actually result in a decrease in sanctions.
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INTRODUCTION
In one of the better-known ads that seek to draw attention to the gravity of
intellectual property (IP) infringement, viewers are told: “You wouldn’t steal a
car. You wouldn’t steal a handbag. You wouldn’t steal a television. You
wouldn’t steal a movie. Downloading pirated films is stealing. Stealing is
against the law. Piracy. It’s a crime.”1 Often without much subtlety, content
owners have for years tried to convince society that copyright infringement
amounts to the same immoral behavior as the theft of tangible goods. Owners
seek to emphasize the fact that infringers take things of value and that, just like
society does not tolerate this in the context of physical property, it should not
have to tolerate it for intellectual property.2 The rhetoric of these content
1. Piracy
It’s
a
Crime,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
4,
2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HmZm8vNHBSU. Ironically, it is unclear whether this
warning against copyright infringement was uploaded to YouTube with permission. The
video was used as a trailer screened in movie theaters and was developed in collaboration
between the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Intellectual Property
Office of Singapore (IPOS). Be HIP at the Movies, IPOS (July 27, 2004),
http://web.archive.org/web/20040804074635/http://www.ipos.gov.sg/main/newsroom/media
_rel/mediarelease1_270704.html.
2. For a discussion of this trend, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 22 (2003) (criticizing the content industries for using “the rhetoric of private property to
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owners is not novel; to the contrary, the term “property” has been applied in
relation to IP throughout American history, although the frequency of its use
remains disputed.3
On the other side of this debate stand a number of scholars and activists
who are quick to point out the multitude of differences between intellectual
property infringement and theft.4 When an object is stolen, the owner is
completely deprived of it, whereas the owner retains an integral copy of a work
when intellectual property infringement occurs.5 Unlike in the case of regular
theft, the intellectual property owner can also continue to sell copies of this
work to willing buyers, provided the market will bear it.6 Furthermore, to the
support their lobbying efforts and litigation”).
3. See generally Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of
Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2006); Adam
Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 426
(2003) (“Copyright is defined and protected in the American legal system as a property right
within the domain of intellectual property. Therefore, to connect copyright to the broader
concept and institutional definition of property better grounds this legal doctrine within our
legal system as such.”). See also Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the
Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005) (showing the parallels
between the benefits and costs of the property system as compared to those of the copyright
system). For a discussion of the relationship between property law and patent law, see, e.g.,
Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687 (2013).
4. See generally STUART P. GREEN, 13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2012) [hereinafter “GREEN, 13 WAYS”]. One of us has reviewed this
work previously. See Irina D. Manta, 13 Ways to Steal a Bicycle: Theft Law in the
Information Age by Stuart Green, 4 IP L. BOOK REV. 11 (2014). This scholarly discussion
takes place in the context of a broader debate about the value of propertizing IP. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1, 4-5 (2004) (“As IP has lost its balance, it has increasingly come to resemble
property. . . . Many courts and companies today unquestioningly view property as justifying
absolute rights of exclusion and a total lack of limits on IP holders.”); David Fagundes,
Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 140 (“Every great story has a villain,
and in the story told by enthusiasts of the public domain, that villain is property.”); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 971 (1990) (criticizing the treatment of IP
as property); Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1143 n.76 (accusing the propertization of IP rights of driving up
transaction costs). But see Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
29, 34 (2005) (stating the possibility that “the Internet exceptionalists’ complaint about
extending copyright to digital media is, at the same time, neither informative nor
instructive—unless one’s goal is to restructure universally the concepts and legal rules for all
property entitlements in American society”). This Article specifically focuses on the “theft”
rather than the slightly different “piracy” label. For a discussion of the historical
development of the latter, see generally ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES (2010).
5. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE
MIND 62-63 (2008) (warning against the idea that “theft is theft” and explaining that while
IP infringement creates losses, society should at most define new crimes to deal with those
losses
rather
than
apply
the
theft
label),
available
at
http://thepublicdomain.org/thepublicdomain1.pdf.
6. Indeed, even in situations that do not involve infringement, intellectual property
owners will frequently grant nonexclusive licenses to multiple entities or individuals. See,
e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of
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extent that the owner suffers a loss at the hands of the IP infringer, that loss is
difficult to calculate.7 Not every infringer would have bought the work had he
lacked the opportunity to infringe.8 At the same time, nobody can say with
certainty about herself—even assuming perfect honesty—which works she
would have bought in a zero-infringement world because the impulse to
rationalize one’s actions in this setting is strong.
The sphere that discusses intellectual property infringement is thus mostly
split between two camps. One of them believes that infringement is theft and
concludes that, if it is theft, the criminal sanctions and harsh civil sanctions that
we have on the books are warranted. The other side denies that infringement is
theft, sometimes downplays the gravity of infringement behavior, and generally
believes that the level of sanctions that American IP law provides is unjustified.
This Article argues that the dichotomy that these two camps endorse is
faulty, and that the question of whether intellectual property infringement
parallels violations of property law requires more nuanced analysis before it
can influence the calibration of sanctions for intellectual property
infringement.9 This Article shows that there is little meaningful difference
between intellectual property infringement and property violations, but that the
question of whether infringement is “theft” has led to the creation of an
unnecessarily confusing and polarized discussion framework.10 While many
scholars are correct to state that intellectual property infringement is not and
cannot be literally the same as theft for the reasons briefly delineated earlier in
this Introduction, such infringement bears significant similarities to and few
distinctions from lesser property-related offenses such as vandalism or, in some
cases, trespass.
If one accepts the idea that IP infringement does at times parallel property
violations, albeit not necessarily theft per se, the startling realization emerges
that IP laws actually may punish wrongdoers more harshly than property law
punishes defendants for equivalent offenses. After creating an analytical model
Contracts, 111 MICH. L. REV. 715, 750-51 (2013) (discussing some of the corporate issues
that arise from such licenses).
7. Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 426-30 (2003) (analyzing
the difficulties inherent in infringement-related calculations of true losses).
8. Id. at 427.
9. Previous scholarly work has grappled with questions along those lines. See, e.g.,
Carrier, supra note 4 (suggesting that propertization can also serve limiting functions);
Fagundes, supra note 4 (describing how propertization can provide greater legal clarity);
Hughes, supra note 3, at 1054 (explaining that propertization should not be confused with
commodification). This Article, however, is the first to focus on the infringement end of
propertization and place such behavior on the spectrum of offenses that we criminalize in the
world of tangible property.
10. Justin Hughes has stated that terms such as “theft” and “piracy” are often used
loosely when we “sense that something ‘belongs’ to someone through some mechanism—
whether legal, ethical, or social” even when no strict concept of property is in place. See
Hughes, supra note 3, at 1010. He also believes that while the Founders did not enshrine the
idea of property into the constitutional protection of IP, historical evidence suggests that
notions of property provided a backbone for this constitutional framework. See id. at 1026.
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to determine the content of “equivalence” in this context, this Article
demonstrates that adopting a truly property-oriented IP legal regime may
actually mandate a view of lowered criminal and civil sanctions. By doing so,
this Article shows how a rigorous understanding of what can be termed the
“propertization” of IP may require a downward adjustment of today’s
punishments and other sanctions, especially in the area of copyright law.
The Article first sets out in Part I the main theories regarding the
relationship between intellectual property infringement and property law
violations and shows some of the flaws in the arguments both for and against
the propertization of IP. Part II analyzes the criminal and civil frameworks
under which American law punishes intellectual property and property offenses
and points out the disparities between the two structures that result in the
harsher punishment of intellectual property infringement. The final Part
concludes.
I.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AS THEFT

This Part examines how courts, scholars, content owners, and activists
have treated the relationship between intellectual property infringement and
property theft so far. As this Part demonstrates, both sides of the debate have
generally provided an incomplete understanding of this relationship, which has
led to a deadlock in the discourse on the topic. First, it is useful to analyze the
arguments that have been made in favor of treating intellectual property
infringement as theft. This Article will mainly focus on copyright in its
discussions of intellectual property because (1) copyright infringement has
been subject to theft rhetoric the most frequently and (2) that area of the law
provides the richest statutory framework to which to draw comparisons.
A. You Wouldn’t Steal a Movie
Content owners and organizations that seek strong protections for
copyrighted goods have used the theft label for a long time and continue to do
so. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) explains
prominently on its website that while copyright infringement is “commonly
known as ‘piracy,’ . . . that’s too benign of a term to adequately describe the
toll that music theft takes on the enormous cast of industry players working
behind the scenes to bring music to your ears.”11 The American government
has often endorsed this same language, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) states that “[p]reventing intellectual property theft is a priority of the
FBI’s criminal investigative program.”12 The government, in conjunction with
11. RIAA,
Who
Music
Theft
Hurts,
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy_details_online (last visited
June 28, 2014).
12. FBI,
It’s an Age-Old Crime: Stealing, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/white_collar/ipr/ipr (last visited June 28, 2014).
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MTV, also produced a music video that made the point unambiguously by
showing artist Addie Brownlee singing in a New York City subway station as
spectators take coins out of her guitar case.13 A narrator states: “When you
download music illegally, you are stealing from musicians, songwriters, and
people like Addie who are denied payment for work that is rightfully theirs.”14
In the United Kingdom, a trade organization named The Federation Against
Copyright Theft (FACT) was established in 1983 and continues to operate in
the interest of content owners.15
The key reason that content owners and their associates use the rhetoric of
theft is that they want to emphasize the gravity of the conduct. The average
downloader might tell herself that it makes little to no difference in the grand
scheme of things if she illegally downloads music or movies, or if she shares
such materials with friends and even a few strangers.16 Basically everybody,
however, understands the concept of theft and has been raised to understand,
often axiomatically, that stealing is wrong.17 Stealing can be defined in a few
different ways, all of which have their advantages and flaws.18 For instance,
within one understanding, stealing represents the taking of something that is not
one’s own.19 This quickly becomes circular, however, if one focuses on the fact
that the law determines what is one’s own, and the law may or may not do so in
a way that is optimal or moral.20 Even property law does not deal in absolutes,
13. Ted Johnson, Effort Designed to Raise Awareness of Copyright Theft, VARIETY
(Nov.
30,
2011),
http://variety.com/2011/biz/news/government-unveils-anti-piracycampaign-1118046785/.
14. See id. The video is available at NCPC, It Hurts, YOUTUBE (Nov. 29, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOBC5kuDS5A.
15. About FACT, FACT, http://www.fact-uk.org.uk/about/ (last visited June 28, 2014).
16. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 771-73 (2003)
(providing explanations for why many people do not view illegal downloading as immoral).
17. See JOHN HOSPERS, HUMAN CONDUCT: PROBLEMS OF ETHICS 12 (2d ed. 1982)
(“Americans generally believe that stealing is wrong and that being caught and punished for
stealing is all right, provided the punishment isn’t too severe . . . .”); Robert Justin Lipkin,
Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective
Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 866 (1990) (“[T]he intuition that
stealing is wrong expresses our desire not to let others interfere with our ownership or use of
property.”).
18. For a discussion of the definition of theft as a matter of historical development, see
Michael A. Tigar, The Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (1984).
19. Roscoe Pound described this idea in the early twentieth century as one that had
existed for a long time. Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 27
HARV. L. REV. 605, 613 (1914). See also GREEN, 13 WAYS, supra note 4, at 73 (“The essence
of theft and other property offenses is that they involve an offender’s (wrongfully) causing
harm to another’s interests in, and rights to, property.”).
20. See Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of
Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 591 (2000) (“[S]tating that a law is needed because ‘theft’ will be
rampant unless we pass the very law that converts what is now privileged use into ‘theft’ is
circular.”). Adherents of natural rights theory may argue that there is a concept of “one’s
own” that predates legal definitions. For a natural rights approach to intellectual property,
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and American law has doctrines that permit easements or the taking of property
through adverse possession.21 Theft can also be defined as the taking of
something of value from another party, but that does not resolve what
constitutes “taking” and, again, which value that other party should be able to
capture for himself in the first place.22
If one were to ask content owners and other proponents of the “IP
infringement as theft” theory to explain their views in greater detail, they would
cite a number of factors that create parallels between the two types of
violations. The IP owner, just like the property owner, generally mixes her
labor with pre-existing materials to provide society with goods and help it
flourish.23 She will sometimes, however, only do so if provided with a critical
mass of remuneration, or at least that remuneration will affect her level of
productivity and of her efforts to distribute her work.24 For the intellectual
property owner, large-scale illegitimate distribution of her works economically
creates the same effect as a horde of potato thieves does for a farmer. In the
farmer’s case, there will be nothing left to buy if all the potatoes are gone. In
the infringer’s case, even though the song will still “be” there in the end, few
people may want to buy it if they can obtain it at zero cost elsewhere.25
Looking at it from the other end, the potato thief ends up with a good for
which he provided no labor or other valuable effort in exchange. Thieves, by
see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). See generally Katrina
Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab Medallions,
30 YALE J. ON REG. 125 (2013) (arguing that the property regime is a creature of the state
and subject to the political influence of interest groups, which results in a mix of efficient
and inefficient laws).
21. See generally Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 657 (2014). For an analysis of the relationship between trademark law and adverse
possession, see Jake Linford, Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor: Productive Use and
Property Acquisition, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 703 (2012).
22. See Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 216 (2002) (discussing the problems with the “thing of value” approach
to theft).
23. For a discussion of Lockean notions of intellectual property related to this idea, see
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-330 (1988).
24. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1571 (2009) (“Copyright law’s principal justification today is the
economic theory of creator incentives.”). Other scholars have noted that non-monetary
incentives to create exist as well. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in
Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012). Professor Peter DiCola’s argues, on the
basis of empirical research, that copyright leads to a winner-take-all outcome and that most
musicians do not benefit from the current legal regime. Peter DiCola, Money from Music:
Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ.
L. REV. 301 (2013).
25. The empirical evidence on the effect of illegal file sharing on music sales is mixed.
See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2050 (2014) (presenting the
results of several studies on the matter and concluding that “[t]he evidence is unclear”)
(citations omitted).
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definition, free ride on others’ efforts.26 Similarly, the IP infringer is just a few
clicks away from illicit goods that he can obtain without, in turn, contributing
to society.27 Had the infringer not downloaded the property illegally, for
example, one of two things would have happened. For one, he may have bought
the good legally and the owner would have made money.28 Alternatively, he
may not have bought the good at all. In this second scenario, while the
intellectual property owner would have felt no financial difference, the
infringer would not have been free riding and would not have had the
opportunity to distribute that good to people who would have purchased the
good legally but for this opportunity.29 There is a further possible loss that
arises from the fact that intellectual property can—contrary to popular
wisdom—be rivalrous at times. In the case of trademarks, the fact that many
people use fake Louis Vuitton bags will disincentivize legitimate buyers from
buying that brand if they value exclusivity or fear being viewed as potential
infringers themselves.30 In the copyright world, some legitimate buyers of
concert tickets may no longer be willing to pay the same amount of money for
what should have been an exclusive show if they know that illegal tapings of
that show will circulate later.31 The more rivalrous intellectual property turns
out to be in a given case, the more it resembles property and the more its
infringement parallels theft.

26. Stuart P. Green, Introduction: Symposium on Thirteen Ways to Steal a Bicycle, 47
NEW ENG. L. REV. 795, 812 (2013) (describing ways in which thieves are free riders). This
has also led Professor Green to draw parallels between intellectual property infringement and
unjust enrichment. See GREEN, 13 WAYS, supra note 4, at 256.
27. Some scholars have discussed how, within the community of illegal downloaders,
another form of free riding takes place among many users, which is to take files from others
but not share any in turn—though this failure to redistribute reduces some of the legal
culpability. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 571-72
(2003) (discussing the factors that lead to this behavior).
28. See GREEN, 13 WAYS, supra note 4, at 255-56 (analyzing the issue of such lost
profits within a theft framework). The case law and U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
recognize the complexity of optimally calculating the infringement amount in instances of
copyright or trademark infringement. See, e.g., United States v. Trang Doan Hoang, 536 Fed.
Appx. 583, 587-90 (6th Cir. 2013) (interpreting and applying the Guidelines on this subject).
29. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1217, 1254
(suggesting that a significant number of illegal downloaders fall into this category). This is
not to say that this scenario could never occur with tangible property, such as if someone
steals rotten, worthless potatoes from a farmer. We would like to thank Greg Dolin for his
comments on this subject.
30. See Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 247-49 (2013).
See generally Shahar J. Dillbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting
Irrational Beliefs, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer
Investment in Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427 (2010).
31. This may not be the case for everyone because some concert goers will feel better
knowing that a performance they plan to attend will also end up online.
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B. I Didn’t Actually Take That Movie
There has been strong opposition to the idea that the harm to an intellectual
property owner that originates in infringement can be equated to the plight of
the potato farmer in the example used above. For one, critics have suggested
that the intellectual property owner retains the original work at all times even if
it is infringed, whereas theft deprives an owner of a good, including the ability
to enjoy it himself or sell it to someone else.32 Second, it is virtually impossible
to remove all value from a good even through a large-scale infringement
operation, which again distinguishes this scenario from theft.33 Third, the
individual culpability of a given infringer tends to be much smaller than the
culpability of a thief.34 Even if an infringer would have bought an artist’s work,
she would have perhaps paid a few dollars in most cases given the high
proportion of infringement that consists of illegal file sharing. Thus, a few
dollars is the most that the IP owner is likely to lose. While many infringers
together can occasion a large loss to a copyright owner, the infringers each tend
only to chip away at the value of the work. Put differently, few infringers can
truly be called the “cause” of a loss in this context, which is not true of
thieves.35
Some have argued that, from a safety perspective, intellectual property
infringement also tends to involve a much lower risk to the public than theft
does because the latter could lead to physical altercations and the like.36 From a
moral standpoint, a number of scholars have questioned what it means to say
that what has become routine behavior for many is genuinely reprehensible.
Scholars have argued that current intellectual property law makes infringers out
of everyone, even people who do not engage in blatant behaviors like illegal

32. See GREEN, 13 WAYS, supra note 4, at 256.
33. See id. We acknowledge, given that these kinds of offenses operate on a

continuum, that the greater a percentage of the value an infringer takes, the more he begins
to approximate the theft scenario.
34. See id. at 256-57.
35. See id.
36. See Christine Hurt, Of Breaches of the Peace, Home Invasions, and Securities
Fraud, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1365, 1377 (2007) (explaining how property crimes such as
robbery “threaten the sanctity of home and hearth”). This is, of course, not true of all
property crimes. For instance, one exception is the electronic theft of bank funds. It is also
worth noting that the concept of self-help does exist in intellectual property law, as
evidenced by the various security measures that owners implement to protect their goods.
See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An
Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275 (2014)
(arguing that criminal sanctions in intellectual property serve the purpose of limiting the
amount of self-help in which owners engage via digital rights management technologies that
hamper legitimate users). Lastly, there is the possibility that the risk of physical altercation
provides a deterrent to potential criminals in the property context in a way that does not
occur in intellectual property. We would like to thank the participants of the Intellectual
Property Law Colloquium at the St. John’s University School of Law for the helpful
discussion on this topic.

340

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:331

downloading.37 Tying that in with theft and the fact that the thief is generally
viewed as an outcast of society who disrespects its rules, a concept of vast
proportions of the population as thieves is puzzling.38
C. The Courts’ Views on Intellectual Property Infringement as Theft
The most significant judicial pronouncement on whether intellectual
property infringement represents a form of theft came in Dowling v. United
States,39 in which the Supreme Court ruled that a National Stolen Property Act
(NSPA) provision that criminalized the interstate transportation of stolen
property could not be used to punish actions involving bootleg records.40 The
defendant in the case had transported bootleg phonorecords with copyrighted
musical compositions by Elvis Presley, and the government argued that this
unauthorized use of the musical compositions turned the phonorecords into
goods that were “stolen, converted or taken by fraud” as understood by the
NSPA.41 The Court rejected this interpretation and stated that “the copyright
owner . . . holds no ordinary chattel. A copyright, like other intellectual
property, comprises a series of carefully defined and carefully delimited
37. See, e.g., JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU
(2011) (describing the disconnect between copyright law and the norms of most Americans).
Recent research suggests that even when it comes to illegal downloading, almost half of
Americans—and as many as 70% of those aged eighteen to twenty-nine—likely engage in
the behavior. See Joe KARAGANIS, Copyright Infringement and Enforcement in the US, AM.
ASSEMBLY 2 (Nov. 2011), available at http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/AA-Research-Note-Infringement-and-Enforcement-November2011.pdf. See generally Mark F. Schultz, Reconciling Social Norms and Copyright Law:
Strategies for Persuading People to Pay for Recorded Music, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 59
(2009).
38. Some scholars have argued that instead of asking courts to mete out punishments,
content owners should focus more attention on changing societal norms to encourage people
to obey the law in the name of principles such as reciprocity. See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and
Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey
Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651 (2006). In any case, a number of experts
believe that attempts to “make an example” of individuals guilty of infringement often meet
with societal resistance and prove counterproductive in combating the behavior. See, e.g.,
Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251 (2011). See generally
PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1996) (reviewing the empirical evidence regarding laws that are
disconnected from community norms); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of
Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007)
(arguing that criminal law should not try to reform people’s intuitions of justice); Paul H.
Robinson et al., Realism, Punishment & Reform [A Reply to Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman,
“Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism”], 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1611, 1613 (2010)
(“[W]hatever the source of the judgments of justice, they are deeply embedded and not
easily modified.”).
39. 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
40. One of us discussed this case in previous work. See Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of
Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 47779 (2011) [hereinafter “Manta, Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions”].
41. 473 U.S. at 214-15.
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interests to which the law affords correspondingly exact protections.”42 Hence,
the Court stated, copyright could not be equated with offenses such as theft,
conversion, or the like.43 The Court specified that an infringer can neither
physically control an asset nor altogether prevent the owner from using it.44
The Court also emphasized that criminalizing copyrighted materials in this
manner did not seem to have been Congress’s intent.45 The dissent, however,
argued that the defendant’s acts corresponded to forms of theft, conversion, and
unauthorized use.46
Not all lower courts have followed Dowling in the context of theft. In
particular, some courts have endorsed the view that intangible property can
actually be stolen. Emphasizing the post-Dowling Congressional amendment to
the NSPA that added the term “transmits”47 to newly cover electronic transfers
in commerce, a few courts held that the transfer of electronic documents48 or
interstate transportation of stolen software49 met the NSPA’s requirements.
One decision even stated several times that a defendant “physically stole”
software when he loaded his employer’s software program onto his laptop
computer and then transported the program in electronic form on his computer
in interstate and international commerce.50 In that case, simply copying a
program was enough for the defendant’s actions to qualify as theft.
These types of cases suggest that either (1) the lower courts have failed to
follow Dowling, (2) some lower courts believe that the addition of the
“transmits” language significantly changes the message of Dowling, or (3)
Dowling did not truly reject the idea that intangible goods protected by
copyright or by other types of intellectual property can be stolen or
converted.51 The Supreme Court may eventually decide a case that will clarify
its understanding of this area of the law, although the addition of the
“transmits” term appears to suggest that in Congress’s opinion, the improper
taking and transfer of intellectual property fits in with other property-related
crimes like theft.52 In the meantime, courts certainly continue to fairly casually
refer to “intellectual property theft” as a concept.53
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 216.
Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 220-26.
Id. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2314 (West 2013).
See, e.g., United States v. Farraj, 142 F. Supp. 2d 484, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
See, e.g., United States v. Alavi, No. CR07–429–PHX–NVW, 2008 WL 1971391,
at *2 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2008). But see United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th
Cir. 1991) (explaining that the Dowling holding removed every form of intangible property
from the purview of the NSPA).
50. Alavi, 2008 WL 1971391, at *2.
51. See Manta, Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 40, at 479.
52. Id.
53. A search on June 28, 2014 of the ALLCASES database on Westlaw revealed
thirty-one instances in which a court used the phrase “intellectual property theft” or “ip
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D. Proper Propertization: IP Infringement as Vandalism or Trespass
The difficulties that have arisen in the debate over whether intellectual
property infringement is theft originate in a number of causes. Content owners
know that the message “intellectual property infringement is [a property
offense lesser than theft]” does not pack the same rhetorical punch as their
current statements. Opponents of the present rhetoric, however, are correct
when they point out that infringement rarely removes all value, which
distinguishes it from theft.54 Meanwhile, there are other types of offenses
against physical property that characterize actions resulting in the partial
reduction of the value of goods. The most prominent of these is vandalism.55
Vandalism involves the destruction rather than removal of property. “The idea
behind criminal punishments for offenses such as vandalism and conversion is
that ownership extends further than the simple holding of legal title to a good
and the ability to transfer such title.”56 The concept of vandalism does not
suffer from the majority of flaws that open up to attack the analogy to theft.
Vandalism, by definition, does not require a complete removal of the good or
of its value. The owner may still retain the ability to sell or license the good.
Additionally, in some cases, both intellectual property infringement and
vandalism have the potential to enhance rather than reduce the value of
goods.57
theft.” A Google search of the phrase “intellectual property theft” yields 219,000 results and
of the phrase “ip theft” 122,000 results. Mark Lemley notes that the phrase “intellectual
property” itself has observed an increase in use in judicial opinions. See Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033-34 (2005).
54. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
55. See Manta, Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 40, at 475.
56. Id.
57. Art vandalism is a great example of a crime in which an action crosses over from
property into the realm of what copyright protects and which can result in either increased or
decreased value. In a recent case involving vandalism against a graffiti work—which is
generally viewed as its own form of vandalism—a man was subject to prosecution for
defacing a Banksy creation. See Sheila V. Kumar, Man Charged with Second-Degree Felony
for
Vandalizing
Banksy
Graffiti,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
19,
2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/08/19/man-charged-with-second-degree-felony-forvandalizing-banksy-graffiti/. Meanwhile, Banksy’s original graffiti vandalism often results
in huge gains for building owners. See, e.g., Scott Reyburn, Disputed Banksy Mural Sells for
More
Than
$1.1
Million,
BLOOMBERG
(June
3,
2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/disputed-banksy-mural-sells-for-more-than-11-million.html. When it comes to intellectual property infringement, illegal downloading can
allow users to discover music or TV shows and can then lead to increased purchases and
hence profits for copyright owners. See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, Remix Without Romance, 44
CONN. L. REV. 415, 475 (2011) (“Similarly, some copyright commentators defend
unauthorized file sharing of copyrighted music on the ground that illegal downloads expose
listeners to new music and thus have a positive marketing effect.”) (citation omitted); Mike
Hohnen, Study Confirms Illegal Downloads Increase Music Sales, MUSICFEEDS (Mar. 22,
2013),
http://musicfeeds.com.au/news/study-confirms-illegal-downloads-increase-musicsales/; Sean Michaels, Study Finds Pirates 10 Times More Likely to Buy Music, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/music/2009/apr/21/study-finds-pirates-buymore-music.
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Of course, no analogy is perfect. Vandalism results in physical damage,
while infringement does not affect the quality of the original good. Moreover,
vandalism generally does not lead to monetary free riding, although it may
bring non-financial enjoyment to the vandal. What generally matters most to
the intellectual property owner, however, is the status of his good’s value.58
Just as infringement can lower the value of an intangible good, so too can
vandalism lower the value of a tangible one. One may further argue that
vandalism must result in damage to be actionable. Indeed, there may be cases in
which another form of property violation may provide an even better parallel,
and that is trespass.
There is usually no requirement that trespass actually create damage, and it
can occur both on land and against chattels. The moral culpability of an illicit
downloader of copyrighted goods—for those who wish to focus on the issue
from that angle—will generally lie, at most, somewhere between that of a
vandal and of a trespasser. We say “at most” because we recognize that vandals
and trespassers may also make property owners feel unsafe, which is usually
not the case with intellectual property infringers.59 The offenses covered by the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which involve the circumvention
of technological protection devices as well as the production and dissemination
of anti-circumvention technologies, may provide a particularly apt analogy to
trespass because they, too, involve a possible “intrusion” that may not carry
actual economic harm.60
Having the public and courts use the mental model of vandalism or trespass
as they think about copyright infringement poses some difficulties for the
content owner, especially in the context of non-commercial infringement. One
big problem that content owners face is the cost of pursuing infringers.61
Indeed, the “thief” label precisely obscures the important fact that no single
perpetrator of non-commercial infringement is responsible for much damage at
58. There are certainly exceptions, however, in that some IP owners view infringement
as a larger moral issue. In the context of alleged intellectual property infringement by a
competitor, Steve Jobs told his biographer: “I will spend my last dying breath if I need to,
and I will spend every penny of Apple’s $40 billion in the bank, to right this wrong. I’m
going to destroy Android because it’s a stolen product. I’m willing to go thermonuclear war
on this.” Josh Lowensohn, Jobs’ ‘Thermonuclear War’ Quote Fair Game in Court, Judge
Says, CNET (June 1., 2012), http://www.cnet.com/news/jobs-thermonuclear-war-quote-fairgame-in-court-judge-says/. We thank Brian Lee for his comments on this subject.
59. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
60. For a discussion of the criminal sanctions contained in the DMCA, see the text
accompanying notes 118-19, infra. See generally Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in
Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687 (2013) (explaining why trespass may not be as different
from patent infringement as some critics have posited). One difference worth noting between
copyright infringement and offenses such as vandalism and trespass is that the latter two
generally do not occur on as large a scale. We would like to thank Chris Beauchamp for his
comments on this topic.
61. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1352 (2004)
(acknowledging the cost of copyright enforcement).
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all.62 At most, that perpetrator is a vandal or trespasser, and how much of a
punishment does an individual like that deserve? How much should he owe a
content owner by way of restitution?63 Indeed, how much damage does a single
commercial infringer cause? Even she is more of a vandal than a thief for the
reasons delineated above.
The next Part of this Article will analyze the statutory framework
surrounding property violations and contrast it with the laws that punish
copyright infringement. This analysis will show that, while individual
perpetrators are more culpable in theft scenarios and occasionally even in
vandalism ones, copyright infringers frequently risk incurring higher penalties
for their offenses than they would incur for the equivalent property violation.
II.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS OF PROPERTY VIOLATIONS AND COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT

Most regulation of property violations is a creature of state law, while
copyright law lives in the federal domain. Subpart II.A. will use relevant
examples from state jurisdictions to make its case about the current status of the
law of property violations in the United States. Subpart II.B. will then discuss
the key statutes that deal with copyright infringement. As will become apparent
in Subpart II.C., the law does not actually treat copyright infringers like
trespassers, vandals, or sometimes even thieves. Rather, it often treats them
worse than if they had committed property violations of that sort.
A. Sanctions for Theft, Vandalism, and Trespass in the State and Federal
Systems
This Subpart will examine the current state of sanctions for property law
violations in the United States. It will analyze both conventional theft statutes
and statutes that criminalize the destruction or damage of property, such as by
vandalism, as well as laws relating to trespass. Since most criminal laws of this
type are in the province of the states rather than that of the federal government,
this Article will focus on the laws of some of the largest jurisdictions in the
United States, namely California, New York, and Texas.64
California divides theft into two categories: grand theft and petty theft. If a
defendant is convicted of grand theft—defined as theft of money, labor, or real
or personal property with a value over $95065—, she may be punished by
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year and a fine of $5,000.66
62. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
63. Note that this Article uses the term “desert” as part of a larger utilitarian

framework rather than a retributivist one.
64. We provide two appendices at the end of this Article that list the statutes for all
states as well as the maximum sanctions for the hypotheticals we discuss.
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 487 (West 2013).
66. Id. § 489.
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Petty theft includes all other acts of theft67 and can be punished by a maximum
of six months imprisonment in county jail and a $1,000 fine.68
Meanwhile, vandalism is prosecuted under California Penal Code Section
594, which states that if one maliciously defaces, damages, or destroys another
person’s property without the consent of the owner, one is subject to penalties
of up to one year in jail and $50,000 in fines.69 In some cases, the defendant is
also required to pay restitution to the victim, which may exceed the value of the
property damaged. For example, in In re Alexander A., the defendant was
forced to pay approximately four times the value of the property to return it to
its pre-vandalism state.70 In short, the maximum base penalty for both general
property damage and property theft in California is one year in jail, with
possible additional time for various aggravating circumstances.
In New York, the classifications of theft and the potential sentences have
many more gradations and depend upon the amount of money that a stolen item
is worth. If the property involved in a theft is valued at over $1,000 but less
than $3,000, then the crime is grand larceny in the fourth degree.71 Grand
larceny in the fourth degree is a class E felony,72 and it is punishable by up to
four years in prison.73 If the property’s value is greater than $3,000 but no more
than $50,000, then the crime is grand larceny in the third degree74 and is
punishable by up to seven years in prison.75 If the value of the property is
greater than $50,000 but not more than $1,000,000, then the crime is grand
larceny in the second degree76 and is punishable by up to fifteen years in
prison.77 Finally, if property valued over $1,000,000 is stolen, then the crime is
grand larceny in the first degree78 and is punishable by imprisonment for up to
twenty-five years.79
The law in New York treats damage or destruction of personal property in
a way similar to theft, but with different thresholds and punishments.
Destroying property with a relatively low value is deemed criminal mischief in
the fourth degree80 and is punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment.81 If
one destroys property with the damage totaling more than $250, one commits

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. § 488.
Id. § 490.
Id. § 594.
In re Alexander A., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 727 (Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
N.Y. PENAL LAW §155.30 (McKinney 2014).
Id.
Id. § 70.00.
Id. § 155.35.
Id. § 70.00.
Id. § 155.40.
Id. § 70.00.
Id. § 155.42.
Id. § 70.00.
Id. § 145.00.
Id. § 70.15.
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criminal mischief in the third degree (a class E felony)82 and faces a possible
sentence of four years in prison.83 If the damage exceeds $1,500, one commits
criminal mischief in the second degree84 and faces up to seven years in
prison.85
Finally, in Texas, a sliding scale is used to determine an appropriate
punishment for damage to personal property, with the amount of damage done
dictating increased punishments again. If someone damaged someone else’s
property and the damage is less than $50, then she has committed the class C
misdemeanor of criminal mischief,86 and she will face a potential punishment
of a fine not to exceed $500.87 The same crime is a class B misdemeanor if the
amount of pecuniary loss is $50 or more but less than $500,88 in which case it
carries a possible sentence of both a fine not to exceed $2,000 and confinement
in jail for up to 180 days.89 If the amount of damage is between $500 and
$1,500, then the person has committed a class A misdemeanor90 and could face
both a fine not to exceed $4,000 and confinement in jail for up to one year.91
The next level of punishment in Texas is called a “state jail felony” and
results if the amount of pecuniary loss is $1,500 or more but less than
$20,000,92 in which case the defendant may be fined up to $10,000 and
sentenced to confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two
years.93 A felony of the third degree occurs if the amount of pecuniary loss is at
least $20,000 but no more than $100,00094 and carries with it a maximum
sentence of imprisonment of not more than ten years and a fine not to exceed
$10,000.95 The next gradation of felony is a felony of the second degree. This
involves an amount of pecuniary loss of $100,000 or more but less than
$200,00096 and carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment of not more than
twenty years and a maximum fine of $10,000.97 Finally, a felony of the first
degree exists if the amount of pecuniary loss is $200,000 or more.98 Such an
offense could carry a sentence as high as imprisonment for life or for any term

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. § 145.05.
Id. § 70.00.
Id. § 145.10.
Id. § 70.00.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03 (West 2013).
Id. § 12.23.
Id. § 28.03.
Id. § 12.22.
Id. § 28.03.
Id. § 12.21.
Id. § 28.03.
Id. § 12.35.
Id. § 28.03.
Id. § 12.34.
Id. § 28.03.
Id. § 12.33.
Id. § 28.03.
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of not more than ninety-nine years in addition to a $10,000 fine.99 Penalties for
actual property theft also vary depending upon the value of the stolen goods. In
fact, the severity of the punishment is the same whether the property has been
damaged or stolen. For example, theft is a class C misdemeanor if the value of
the property stolen is less than fifty dollars, and a felony of the first degree if
said property has a value of $200,000 or more.100
To sum up, in the states examined here, the maximum penalties for theft
range from a sentence of six months and a $1,000 dollar fine for petty theft in
California to a sentence of ninety-nine years or life and a $10,000 fine for
stealing something worth more than $200,000 in Texas. Similarly, crimes
involving property damage have a maximum sentence of one year’s
imprisonment for a small amount of damage to property in New York and
ninety-nine years in prison and a $10,000 fine in Texas if the damage is over
$200,000.
There are also federal statutes that deal with thefts of various types. For
example, in special maritime or territorial jurisdictions of the United States, if
someone steals property worth more than $1,000, that person may be fined and
sentenced to imprisonment for up to five years.101 If the value of the item
stolen is less than $1,000, the maximum imprisonment term is lowered to one
year.102 If someone steals from the United States (or any department/agency of
the United States), then the punishment for stealing goods worth less than
$1,000 remains the same at one year’s imprisonment.103 If the value of the
stolen goods is more than $1,000, however, the maximum is increased to ten
years’ imprisonment and a fine.104 One other example involving federal law
deals with the theft of mail. If someone steals a letter from the post office (in
any of a number of ways), that individual may be punished by a fine and
imprisonment for up to five years.105
A different type of property offense often punished by the states is that of
trespass. In California, basic trespass occurs when one enters upon any land
belonging to someone else that is either surrounded by a fence or has no
trespassing signs posted, and then refuses to leave when asked to do so.106 This
offense is punishable by a fine not to exceed $100 for the first offense and by a
fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for six months for all subsequent
offenses.107 In Texas, trespassing involves going onto someone else’s property
without consent with the knowledge that entry was forbidden and refusing to

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. § 12.32.
Id. § 31.03.
18 U.S.C.A. § 661 (West 2013).
Id.
Id. § 641.
Id.
Id. § 1708.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 602 (West 2013).
Id.
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leave when asked.108 Violators of this Texas law may face a maximum
sentence of a $2,000 fine and confinement in jail for up to 180 days.109 In New
York, a person commits trespass if she knowingly enters or remains unlawfully
on any premises.110 If found guilty of this violation, she may be sentenced to a
maximum prison sentence of fifteen days.111 In some circumstances, the
federal government will also prosecute trespassers. For example, if someone
goes onto any national forest land while it is closed to the public without the
authority to do so, he may be fined and imprisoned for up to six months.112
B. Sanctions for Copyright Infringement
Federal law criminalizes the reproduction and distribution of copyrighted
work.113 This offense occurs if a defendant reproduces or distributes, during
any 180-day period, one or more copies of one or more copyrighted works,
which together have a total retail value greater than $1,000.114 The defendant
may face a possible punishment of imprisonment for no more than one year,
and the punishment may increase to five years in prison if the retail value is
over $2,500.115 He may also be imprisoned for up to ten years if it is his second
offense.116
Other federal crimes do not have any monetary values attached to them.
For example, if a defendant records or distributes music without the consent of
the owner, she may be subject to imprisonment for no more than five years for
her first offense and no more than ten years for any second or other subsequent
offense.117 There are also several violations to which criminal sanctions can
attach under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. One offense consists of
circumventing or providing the means for others to circumvent various
technological copyright protection measures.118 If a defendant is convicted of
circumventing copyright measures, she may be fined up to $500,000,
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (West 2013).
Id. § 12.22.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.05 (McKinney 2014).
Id. § 70.15.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1863 (West 2013).
For a discussion of the political process that resulted in many of the copyright laws
we have today, see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987). See also Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439
(2009) (critiquing on due process grounds the current system of statutory sanctions in
copyright law).
114. 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(1)(B) (West 2014). One of us has discussed the constitutional
problems inherent in the way that this and other statutes have been applied. See Irina D.
Manta, Intellectual Property and the Presumption of Innocence, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1745 (2015).
115. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319(b) (West 2013).
116. Id. § 2319(b)(2).
117. Id. § 2319A(a).
118. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (West 2014).
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imprisoned for up to five years, or both for the first offense, and she could then
be fined up to $1,000,000 and imprisoned for ten years for any subsequent
offense.119
While criminal sanctions tend to impose greater hardship on individuals
than civil ones do, copyright law involves the possibility of significant civil
statutory sanctions worth mentioning here.120 In most copyright infringement
lawsuits, plaintiffs can elect to receive statutory damages of $750 to $30,000
per work rather than actual damages.121 If the infringement is deemed to have
been willful, the statutory damages award can rise to as high as $150,000 per
work.122 A few copyright cases have attained national attention for their
staggering total statutory awards. In one such case, a Minnesota woman named
Jammie Thomas was ordered to pay $1.92 million in damages for willfully and
illegally sharing twenty-four copyrighted songs; these damages were later
reduced to $222,000.123 Meanwhile, Boston University student Joel
Tenenbaum was ordered to pay $675,000 for illegally sharing thirty songs.124
C. Disparity and Disconnect
While, as discussed above, a number of scholars and content owners
advocate for intellectual property to receive the same level of protection as
property, few would openly say that, as a theoretical matter, it should receive
more. In the discussions about intellectual property as property, the concept of
property is generally viewed as a ceiling in that category. One would therefore
expect that when it comes to sanctions, intellectual property infringement
would at most be punished at the same level as property violations. This Article
has shown that intellectual property infringement bears the most resemblance to
vandalism and trespass. In the realm of sanctions, however, not only are the
statutory criminal and civil sanctions generally higher for intellectual property
infringement than those for vandalism, but they are also higher than those for
downright property theft.125
119. Id. § 1204.
120. As Kenneth Mann has discussed, depending on the circumstances, civil sanctions

that—intentionally or not—take a punitive form have the potential to cause as much
disruption to an individual’s life as criminal sanctions. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1798
(1993).
121. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2012).
122. Id. § 504(c)(2).
123. See Greg Sandoval, Appeals Court Sides with RIAA, Jammie Thomas Owes
$222,000, CNET (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/appeals-court-sideswith-riaa-jammie-thomas-owes-222000/.
124. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 515 (1st Cir. 2011). Some
scholars have argued that the current system of statutory sanctions goes so far in its lack of
proportionality as to be unconstitutional. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 113, at
466-68.
125. This is not to say that the statutory maxima for theft are always higher than those
for vandalism.
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One of the ways to make a comparison is to imagine a hypothetical good of
a certain value and examine how it would be treated under the laws that relate
to intellectual property versus property. As will become apparent, this exercise
is not without its problems and perils, but it is informative nonetheless. Let us
assume that an individual distributes a song illegally to 1001 other individuals.
The song would normally cost $1 to download legally. Had all 1001 individuals
who obtained illegal copies bought the song in a legitimate fashion, its owner
would have earned $1,001.126 That being said, in this type of situation,
undoubtedly not all 1001 people would have actually bought the song, so the
harm to the song owner would be lower.127 Furthermore, one could argue that
this distribution may constitute a proximate cause for future redistributions,
which would bring about greater harm. The extent of this redistribution and of
the role that the initial distributor played in its causation are difficult to predict,
as is the number of people who would or would not have bought a given song
legally. As a matter of approximation, let us therefore proceed with the figure
of $1,001 for the harm (the high end) but with no regard for subsequent harm
involving redistribution. Indeed, that is the figure that copyright law would use
to evaluate the gravity of the offense. Whether the action was taken for profit or
not, a person guilty of this violation could go to prison for up to a year128 and
be fined up to $100,000.129 If that individual distributed the song to 2501
people (thus causing a potential harm of $2,501), she would face a maximum
sentence of five years if she did it for profit or three years if she did not.130 She
could also be fined up to $250,000.131
What do maximum sentences look like in the context of theft and
vandalism for offenses that deprive an owner of $1,001 and $2,501 of his
property, respectively? Here are the maximum figures for theft:
Theft
California

$1,001
One year prison, $5,000
fine
Four years prison, $5,000
or double profits fine

$2,501
One
year
prison,
$5,000 fine
New York
Four years prison,
$5,000
or
double
profits fine
Texas
One year prison, $4,000 Two years prison,
fine
$10,000 fine
As one can see, the possible fines for intellectual property offenses vastly
outpace the fines for property offenses. When it comes to prison offenses, the
126. To simplify, this hypothetical will assume that a single entity owns the song and
profits from its sales.
127. See Goldman, supra note 7, at 427-28 (discussing the problems that lie with the
assumption that each infringement represents a lost sale).
128. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319(c)(3) (West 2013).
129. Id. § 3571(b)(5).
130. Id. § 2319.
131. Id. § 3571(b)(3).
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sentences on the intellectual property side are the same as or higher than all but
one of the six possibilities in the table above (New York at $1,001 has a higher
prison sentence). Meanwhile, here are the figures for vandalism:

Vandalism
California
New York
Texas

$1,001
One year, $50,000
Four years
One year, $4,000

$2,501
One year, $50,000
Seven years
Two years, $10,000

Again, the fines for intellectual property offenses greatly exceed any of the
fines for vandalism. The prison sentences are generally either the same or
higher for intellectual property offenses, except in New York where vandalism
leads to higher maximum prison sentences at both values.
When it comes to offenses under the DMCA, as mentioned previously, the
maximum penalty for a first offense is a five-year prison sentence and
$500,000 in fines (figures that are not connected in the statute to the size of the
economic harm). Here is the comparison to trespass on land:
Trespass
California
New York
Texas

Penalty
$100 fine
Fifteen days in prison, $250 fine
180 days in prison, $2,000 fine

Both the maximum prison sentence and fines that the DMCA carries are
much greater than the possible penalties for trespass.
Overall, the pattern emerges that we do not actually treat intellectual
property like property but rather often provide the option of harsher
punishments for offenses against IP rights—sometimes dramatically so—than
for those against tangible or real property rights. This disparity is made even
more extreme when one considers the differences in the commission of the
physical acts required for property offenses as opposed to those typically
related to intellectual property infringement. For instance, to return to our
earlier hypothetical, distributing a song to thousands of people need only take a
few mouse clicks. Within seconds, an individual can make himself eligible for
the highest sanctions under the criminal copyright laws. Within a few more
seconds, he may have committed a second, separate offense that carries its own
penalties. Meanwhile, stealing or vandalizing high-value goods generally takes
quite a bit of effort and time (and may also involve the use of force).132 When
132. For a discussion of the relationship between theft and violence, see supra note 36.
Some have argued that the ease with which computer-related offenses can be committed
militates for raising sanctions in that context to create “cost deterrence.” See Neal Kumar
Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (2001). One counterargument in the copyright context, however, is the issue that larger sentences are
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we consider the situation focusing on mens rea, the illicit distributor of files
may act maliciously for five seconds and then realize that he acted
inappropriately.133 Of course, shared files usually cannot be recovered.134 With
copyright infringement, a mens rea of very short duration can incur significant
sanctions. After violations are committed and discovered, a prosecutor in a
copyright case has a lot of discretion in how to stack charges and persuade
offenders, who are intimidated by the high maximum punishments they face, to
agree to harsh plea bargains.135
The disparities that we see between the property and intellectual property
regimes may not be driven by a reasoned conclusion that intellectual property
infringement is worse for society or more morally culpable than theft. Rather,
as an initial matter, sanctions are often higher across contexts at the federal
level than the state level for similar offenses.136 Second, owners of copyrighted
(and trademarked) goods have over the years exerted a lot of pressure on the
political process to maximize sanctions through a variety of bills.137 While the

increasingly in tension with community norms and actually create a backlash in individuals’
responses to laws perceived as unfair. See supra note 38. It is also worth noting that while
difficulty of detection may have once been a stronger argument in favor of high sanctions,
many copyright infringers are now more easily identifiable than before. See, e.g., Brendan
Sasso, Internet Providers Sent 1.3 Million Warnings to Alleged Pirates, NAT’L J. (May 28,
2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/internet-providers-sent-1-3-million-warnings-toalleged-pirates-20140528 (explaining how the first ten months of the “six strikes” Copyright
Alert System yielded 1.3 million infringement warnings, of which only 265 were challenged
and no more than 47 were deemed erroneous). See generally Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L.
Katz, When Good Value Chains Go Bad: The Economics of Indirect Liability for Copyright
Infringement, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 961, 963-68 (2001) (discussing the costs and benefits of
various legal regimes in the area of illegal downloads). We appreciate Orin Kerr’s and Brian
Lee’s comments on this topic.
133. Because mouse clicks happen so rapidly, many copyright infringers are unable to
abort their attempts and avail themselves of the abandonment defense that arises in other
legal contexts. See generally Robert E. Wagner, A Few Good Laws: Why Federal Criminal
Law Needs a General Attempt Provision and How Military Law Can Provide One, 78 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1043, 1070 (2010).
134. See Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 638-43 (2011). This issue also arises in non-property contexts
such as criminal libel and slander. We would like to thank Jake Linford for his comments on
this subject. We would also like to note that in at least some scenarios involving theft of
physical objects, the goods may be recovered later. We thank Andres Sawicki for his related
remarks.
135. One of us has discussed this issue in the context of the story of Aaron Swartz, who
faced severe charges based on information offenses and committed suicide before his trial.
See Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157, 194-200 (2014).
136. For example, Rachel Barkow has suggested that the states are more aware of the
costs surrounding incarceration and other forms of law enforcement and therefore often take
a more moderate approach. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1301 (2005). Indeed, as mentioned previously,
federal theft and vandalism offenses are also punished more harshly, although that may stem
in part from the federal government’s strong desire for self-protection.
137. See Manta, Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 40, at 505-12 (providing a
public choice analysis of criminal sanctions in intellectual property).
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argument that intellectual property should be treated like property has been
used many times to continue to increase sanctions, this Part shows that bringing
intellectual property fully in line with property in the arena of sanctions would
actually likely mean that the sanctions for intellectual property violations
should be decreased rather than increased.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate the counterintuitive effect that a
consistent approach to the propertization of IP has on related sanctions. We
have argued that the rhetorical move of using the concept of property to
increase sanctions and deploy harsher enforcement techniques stands in
contrast to the actual structure of our system of property sanctions. In short, we
often punish intellectual property violations with greater vigor than we would
equivalent property offenses. Should our realization enter the legal mainstream,
we predict a decrease in property language on the part of intellectual property
owners because the instrumental value of that rhetoric would decrease if the
goal of the speakers is simply broader and deeper protection. In the end, we
agree with those who say that there are significant commonalities between
property and intellectual property. Unlike many of the other advocates of that
view, however, we are not invested in a particular outcome when it comes to
sanctions. Rather, our goal is the promotion of productivity and free enterprise.
Establishing optimal sanctions for property, intellectual property, or other legal
regimes ultimately requires a more fine-grained analysis than that with which
general labels can ever provide us.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: VALUE OF THEFT/DAMAGE $1,000.01 TO $2,500.00 (STATUTE IN
PARENTHESES)138

State

Theft Value
$1,000.01 or
more

Alabama
(Ala. Code)

$500-$2,500
(§13A-8-3)

Alaska (AS)

$750-$25,000
(§11.46.130)

Arizona
(A.R.S.)

$1,000$1,999
(§13-1802)

Arkansas
(A.C.A.)

$1,000.01$4,999
(§5-36-103)

California
(Cal. Pen.
Code)
Colorado
(C.R.S.A.)

$950 or more
(§487)
$750-$1,999
(§18-4-401)

Theft
Penalty139

10 years,
$15,000
(§13A-5-6)
(§13A-5-11)
5 years,
$50,000
(§12.55.15)
(§12.55.035)
1.5 years,
$150,000
(§13-702)
(§13-801)

6 years,
$10,000
(§5-4-401)
(§5-4-201)
1 year,
$5,000
(§489)
1 year,
$1,000
(§18-1.3-505)

Vandalism
Value
$1,000.01 or
more

$500-$2,500

More than
$750
(§11.46.482)
Less than
$1,500
(§13-1604)

$1,000.01$5,000
(§5-38-203)
$400 or more
(§594)
$1,000$4,999
(§18-4-501)

Vandalism
Penalty

1 year,
$6,000
(§13A-5-7)
(§13-5-12)
5 years,
$50,000
(§12.55.125)
(§12.55.035)
1.5 years,
$150,000
(§13-702)
(§13-801)

6 years,
$10,000
(§5-4-401)
(§5-4-201)
1 year,
$10,000
(§594)
18 months,
$100,000
(§18-1.3-401)

Trespass Value140
$1,000.01 or
more

Trespass Penalty

(§13A-7-2)

1 year, $6,000
(§13A-5-7)
(§13-5-12)

(§11.46.320)

1 year, $10,000
(§12.55.135)
(§12.55.035)

(§13-1504)

1.5 years,
$150,000
(§13-702)
(§13-801)
or 6 months,
$2,500
(§13-707)
(§13-802)
90 days, $1,000
(§5-4-401)

(§5-39-203)

(§601)

1 year, $2,000
(§601)

(§18-4-502)

3 years, $100,000
(§18-1.3-401)

138. Each state’s relevant statutes are listed in parentheses. Several states list penalties
separately from the crimes themselves, which is why several penalty provisions may be
listed. See, e.g., Alabama’s Theft Penalty, Ala. Code § 13A-8-3.
139. All penalties state maximum prison or jail sentences and maximum fines.
140. The majority of trespass statutes do not specify an amount of damage. In those
instances, the statute for criminal trespass is simply cited.
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Connecticut
(C.G.S.A.)

$1,000 or
more
(§53a-125)

Delaware
(11 Del. C.)
District of
Columbia
(DC ST)

Less than
$1,500
(§841)
$1,000 or
more
(§22-3212)

Florida
(F.S.A.)

$300-$4,999
(§812.014)

5 years,
$5,000
(§775.082)
(§775.08)

$1,000.01 or
more
(§806.13)

Georgia
(Ga. Code
Ann.)

$1,500 or less
(§16-8-12)

1 year,
$1,000 (§1710-3)

More than
$500
(§16-7-23)

Hawaii
(HRS)

$300.01
(§708-831)

Idaho
(I.C.)
Illinois
(ILCS)

Indiana
(IC)
Iowa
(I.C.A.)

1 year,
$2,000
(§53a-26)
(§53a-42)
1 year,
$2,300
(§4206)
10 years,
$25,000
(§22-3212)
(§223571.01)

$250.01$1,500 (§53a116)
More than
$1,000 (§811)
(§22-312.01)

5 years,
$500.01
$10,000 +
(§708-822)
$1,000 min
(§706-660;
§706-640)
(§708-831)
$1,000.01 or
20 years,
$1,000.01 or
more
$10,000
more
(§18-2407)
(§18-2408)
(§18-7001)
$500.015 years,
$300.01$10,000
$25,000 (720
$10,000
(720 ILCS
ILCS 5/5-7.5(720 ILCS
5/16-1)
40)
5/21-1)
(720 ILCS
5/5-4.5-50)
$750-$49,999
3 years,
$750-$49,999
(§35-43-4-2)
$10,000
(§35-43-1-2)
(§35-50-2-7)
$1,000.015 years,
$1,000.01$10,000
$7,500
$10,000
(§714.2)
(§902.9)
(§716.4)

1 year,
$2,000
(§53a-26)
(§53a-42)
1 year,
$2,300
(§4206)
180 days, at
least $250,
$1,000 max
(§223312.04)
(§223571.01)
5 years,
$5,000
(§775.082)
(§860.13)
(§775.083)
5 years
(§16-7-22)
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1 year, $2,000
(§53a-26)
(§53a-42)

(§823)

1 year, $2,300
(§4206)

(§22-3301)

1 year, $2,500
(§22-3301)
(§22-3571.01)

(§810.09)

1 year, $1,000
(§775.082)
(§775.083)

$500 or less
(§16-7-21)

12 months,
$1,000 (§17-103)

$2,000
(§706-663)
(§706-640)

(§708-813)

1 year, $2,000
(§706-663)
(§706-640)

1 year,
$1,000
(§08-7001)
3 years,
$25,000
(720 ILCS
5/5-7.5-45)
(720 ILCS
5/5-4.5-50)
1 year,
$5,000
(§35-50-3-2)
5 years,
$7,500
(§902.9)

(§18-7011)

6 months, $1,000
(§18-7011)

(720 ILCS
5/21-3)

1 year, $2,500
(720 ILCS 5/54.5-55)

$750-$49,999
(§35-43-2-2)

3 years, $10,000
(§35-50-2-7)

$200.01 or more
(§716.8)

1 year, $1,875
(§903.1)

356

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

Kansas
(K.S.A.)

$1,000$24,999
(§21-5801)

Kentucky
(KRS)

$500-$9,999
(§514.030)

Louisiana
(LSA-RS)

$500-$1,499
(LSAR.S.§67)

Maine
(Title 32
M.R.S.A.)

$1,000.01$10,000
(§353)

Maryland
(MD Code,
Criminal Law)
Massachusetts
(M.G.L.A.)

$1,000$9,999
(§7-104)
More than
$250
(266 §30)

Michigan
(M.C.L.A.)

$1,000$19,999
(§750.356)

Minnesota
(M.S.A.)
Mississippi
(Miss. Code
Ann.)
Missouri
(RSMo)

7 months,
$100,000
(§21-6611)
(§21-6804)
5 years,
$10,000
(§532.020)
(§534.0)
10 years,
$3,000 (LSAR.S.§67)

5 years,
$5,000
(§1252)
(§1301)
10 years,
$10,000
(§7-104)
5 years OR 2
years,
$25,000
(266 §30)

5 years,
greater of
$10,000 or 3x
value
(§750.356)
$1,000.015 years,
$4,999
$10,000
(§609.52)
(§609.52)
$1,0005 years,
$4,999
$10,000
(§97-17-41)
(§97-17-41)
$500-$24,999
7 years,
(§570.030)
greater of
$5,000 or 2x
value
(§570.030)
(§558.011)
(§560.011)
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$1,000$24,999
(§21-5813)

$100,000
(§21-6611)
(§21-6804)

(§21-5808)

6 months, $1,000
(§21-6602)
(§21-6611)

$1,000 or
more
(§512.020)

5 years,
$10,000
(§532.020)
(§534.030)
2 years,
$1,000
(LSA-R.S.
§14-56)

(§511.060)

1 year, $500
(§532.020)
(§534.040)

(LSA-R.S. §63)

30 days, $500
(LSA-R.S. §63)

(§402)

1 year, $2,000
(§1252)
(§1301)

(§6-402)

90 days,
$500(§6-402)

(266 § 120)

30 days, $100
(266 §120)

(§750.552)

30 days, $250
(§750.552)

(§609.605)

90 days, $1,000
(§609.03)

(§97-17-87)

6 months, $500
(§97-17-87)

(§569.140)

6 months, $500
(§558.011)
(§560.016)

Simple
criminal
damage at
property
$500$49,999(LSA
-R.S. §14:56)
(§806)

$1,000 or
more
(§6-301)
(266 §127)

$1,000$19,999
(§750.377a)

More than
$1,000
(§609.595)
$1,000.01$4,999
(§97-17-67)
More than
$750
(§569.100)

1 year,
$2,000
(§1252)
(§1301)
3 years,
$2,500
(§6-301)
Greater of
$1,500 or 3x
value OR 2.5
years
(266 §127)
5 years,
greater of
$10,000 or 3x
value
(§750.377a)
5 years,
$10,000
(§609.595)
5 years,
$10,000
(§97-17-67)
4 years,
greater of
$5,000 or 2x
value
(§558.011)
(§569.100)
(§560.011)

Winter 2015]

IP AS VANDALISM

Montana
(MCA)

$1,500 or less
(§45-6-301)

Nebraska
(Neb.Rev.St.)

$500-$1,500
(§28-518)

Nevada
(N.R.S.)141

$650.01$3,499
(§205.222)

New
Hampshire
(N.H. Rev.
Stat)
New Jersey
(N.J.S.A.)

$1,000.01$1,500
(§637:11)

7 years,
$4,000
(§651:2)

$500.01$74,999
(§2C:20-2)

5 years,
$15,000
(§2C:43-6
(§2C:43-3)
18 months,
$5,000
(§31-18-15)
4 years
(§70.00) (no
fine specified
§80.00)
8 years
(§15A1340.17)
fines appear
to be
discretionary
(§15A-1361
et seq.)

New Mexico
(N.M.S.A.
1978)
New York
(McKinney’s
Penal Law)

$500.01$2,500
(§30-16-1)
More than
$1,000
(§155.30)

North Carolina
(N.C.G.S.A.)

Larceny of
goods More
than $1,000
(§14-72)

North Dakota
(NDCC)

6 months,
$1,500 or less
$1,500
(§45-6-101)
(§45-6-301)
5 years,
$500-$1,499
$10,000 (§28(§28-519)
105)
5 years,
$250-$4,999
$10,000
(§206.330)
(§193.130)
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6 months,
$1,500
(§45-6-101)
1 year,
$1,000
(§28-106)
364 days,
$2,000
(§193.140)

($45-6-203)

6 months, $500
(§45-6-203)

(§28-520)

1 year, $1,000
(§28-106)

(§206.140)

$100.01$1,500
(§634:2)

1 year,
$2,000
(§651:2)

$1,500 or less
(§635:2)

Value of damage,
at least 6 months,
$1,000
(§206.140)
(§193.150)
1 year, $1,200
(§651:2)

$500.01$1,999
(§2C:17-3)

18 months,
$10,000
(§2C:43-6)
(§2C:43-3)
18 months,
$5,000
(§31-18-15)
4 years
(§70.00) (no
fine specified
§80.00)
6 months,
$1,000
(§14-3)
(§15A1340.23)

(§2C:18-3)

More than
$1,000
(§30-15-1)
More than
$250
(§145.05)

Vandalism
statutes are
specific to
agriculture,
public
facilities, and
other unique
categories
(e.g. §14-132)
$1,000.01 or
5 years,
$100-$2,000
1 year,
more
$10,000
(reckless
$3,000
(§12.1-23-05) (§12.0-32-01) damage More (§12.1-32-01)
than $2,500)
(§12.1-21-05)

(§30-14-1.1)

(§140.15)

18 months,
$10,000 (§2C:436)
(§2C:43-3)
Double appraised
value of damage
(§30-14-1.1)
1 year, $1,000
(§70.15)
(§80.00)

More than
$200(§14-160)

1 year,
discretionary fine
(§14-3)
(§15A-1340.23)

(§12.1-22-03)

1 year, $3,000
(§12.1-32-01)

141. Nevada has separate statutes for theft and larceny; larceny statutes are cited herein.
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Ohio (R.C.)

$1,000$7,499
(§2913.02)

1 year,
$2,500
(§2929.14)
(§2929.18)

$1,000 or
more
(§2909.05)

Oklahoma
(21
Okl.Stat.Ann)
Oregon
(O.R.S.)

$500 or more
(§1705)

$1,000 or
more
(§1760)
$1000.01 or
more
(§164.365)

Pennsylvania
(Pa.C.S.A.)

$50-$1999.99
(§3903)

Rhode Island
(Gen. Laws)

$1,500 or less
(§11-41-5)

5 years,
$5,000
(§1705)
5 years,
$125,000
(§161.605)
(§161.625)
5 years,
$10,000
(§1103)
(§1101)
1 year, $500
(§§11-41-5)

$1000 or
more
(§164.055)

South Carolina $2,000 or less
(Code)
(§16-13-30)
South Dakota
(SDCL)
Tennessee
(T.C.A.)

$1,000.01$2,500
(§22-30A-17)
$1,000$9,999
(§39-14-105)

Texas
(V.T.C.A.)

$500-$1,499
(§31.03)

Utah
(U.C.A.)

$500-$1,499
(§76-6-412)

Vermont
(V.S.A.)

$900.01 or
more
(§2501)
$5 or more
from the
person, $200
or more not
from the
person
(§18.2-95)

Virginia
(VA Code
Ann.)

$1000.01$5,000
(§3304)
(§11-44-1)

30 days,
$2,000 or less
$1,000
(§16-11-520)
(§16-13-30)
2 years,
$1,000.01$4,000
$2,500
(§22-6-1)
(§22-34-11)
12 years,
$1,000$5,000 (§40$9,999
35-111)
(§39-14-105)
1 year,
$4,000
(§12.21)
1 year,
$2,500 (§763-204)
(§76-3-301)
10 years,
$5,000
(§2501)
20 years,
$2,500
(§18.2-95)

$500-$1,499
(§28.03)
$500-$1,499
(§76-6-106)

More than
$1,000
(§3701)
$1,000 or
more
(§18.2-137)

1 year,
$2,500
(§2929.14)
(§2929.18)
(§2905.05)
2 years,
$1,000
(§9)
5 years,
$125,000
(§161.605)
(§161.625)
2 years,
$5,000
(§1103)
(§1101)
1 year,
$1,000
(§11-44-1)
30 days,
$1,000
(§16-11-520)
2 years,
$4,000
(§22-6-1)
12 years,
$5,000
(§40-35-111)
1 year,
$4,000
(§12.21)
1 year,
$2,500
(§76-3-204)
(§76-3-301)
5 years,
$5,000
(§3701)
5 years, OR 2
years and
$2,500
(§18.2-10)
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(§2911.21)

30 days, $250
(§2929.24)
(§2929.28)

(§1835)

30 days, $500
(§1835)

(§164.255)

1 year, $6250
(§161.615)
(§161.635)

(§3503)

1 year, $2,500
(§1103)
(§1101)

(§11-44-26)

1 year, $1,000
(§11-44-26)

(§16-11-600)

30 days, $100
(§16-11-520)

(§22-35-5)

1 year, $2,000
(§22-6-2)

(§39-14-406)

6 months, $500
(§40-35-111)

(§30.05)

1 year, $4,000
(§12.21)

(§76-6-206)

1 year, $2,500
(§76-3-204)
(§76-3-301)

(§3705)

3 years, $2,000
(§3705)

(§18.2-121)

1 year, $2,500
(§18.2-11)
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Washington
(RCWA)

$750.01$5,000
(§9A.56.030)

5 years,
$10,000
(§9A.20.020)

$750 or more
(§9A.48.080)

5 years,
$10,000
(§9a.20.021)

(§9A.52.070)

364 days, $5,000
(§9.92.020)

West Virginia
(W.Va. Code)

$1,000 or
more
(§61-3-13)
$2,500 or less
(§943.20)

10 years,
$2,500
(§61-3-13)
9 months,
$10,000
(§939.51)

Less than
$2,500
(§61-3-30)
Less than
$2,500
(§943.01)

1 year, $500
(§61-3-30)

Knowing (§613B-2)

$100
(§61-3B-2)

(§943.13)

9 months,
$10,000
(§939.51)

$1,000 or
more
(§6-3-402)

10 years,
$10,000
(§6-3-402)

$1,000 or
more
(§6-3-201)

(§6-3-303)

6 months, $750
(§6-3-303)

Wisconsin
(W.S.A.)

9
months,
$10,000
(§939.51)

Wyoming
(W.S.)

10 years,
$10,000
(§6-3-201)
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APPENDIX 2: VALUE OF THEFT/DAMAGE $2,500.01 OR MORE (STATUTE IN
PARENTHESES)

State

Theft Value
$2,500.01 or
more

Alabama
(Ala. Code)

$2500.01 or
more
(§13A-8-4)

Alaska (AS)

$750-$25,000
(§11.46.130)

Arizona
(A.R.S.)

$2,000$2,999
(§13-1802)

Arkansas
(A.C.A.)

$1,000.01$4,999(§536-103)

California
(Cal. Pen.
Code)
Colorado
(C.R.S.A.)
Connecticut
(C.G.S.A.)

Theft
Penalty
20 years,
$30,000
(§13A-5-6)
(§13A-5-11)
5 years,
$50,000
(§12.55.15)
(§12.55.035)
2 years,
$150,000
(§13-702)
(§13-801)

6 years,
$10,000
(§5-4-401)
(§5-4-201)
$950 or more
1 year,
(§487)
$5,000 (§489)
$2,000$4,999
(§18-4-401)
$2,000 or
more
(§53a-124)

Delaware
(11 Del. C.)

$1,500 or
more (§841)

District of
Columbia
(DC ST)

$1000 or
more (§223212)

Vandalism
Value
$2,500.01 or
more

Vandalism
Penalty

Trespass
Value
$2,500.01 or
more

More than
$2500
(§13A-7-21)

10 years,
(§13A-7-2)
$15,000
(§13A-5-6)
(§13A-5-11)
More than
5 years,
(§11.46.320)
$750
$50,000
(§11.46.482)
(§12.55.125)
(§12.55.035)
$1,500-$9,999
2 years,
(§13-1504)
(§13-1604 )
$150,000 (§13702)
(§13-801)

$1,000.01$5,000
(§5-38-203)
$400 or more
(§594)

6 years,
(§5-39-203)
$10,000
(§5-4-401)
(§5-4-201)
1 year,
(§601)
$10,000 (§594)

18 months,
$1,000-$4,999
18 months,
$100,000
(§18-4-501)
$100,000
(§18-1.3-401)
(§18-1.3-401)
5 years,
$1,501 or more 5 years, $5,000
$5,000
(§53a-115)
(§53a-35a)
(§53a-35a)
(§53a-41)
(§53a-41)
2 years, value
More than
1 year, $2,300
of property
$1,000 (§811)
(§4206)
(§4205)
(§4106)
10 years,
Defacing
180 days, at
$25,000
Public or
least $250,
(§22-3212)
Private
$1,000 max
(§22Property
(§22-3312.04)
3571.01)
(§22-3312.01) (§22-3571.01)

(§18-4-502)

(§53a-107)

Trespass
Penalty
1 year, $6000
(§13A-5-7)
(§13-5-12)
1 year, $10,000
(§12.55.135)
(§12.55.035)
1.5 years,
$150,000 (§13702)
(§13-801)
or 6 months,
$2,500
(§13-707) (§13802)
90 days, $1,000
(§5-4-401) (§54-201)
1 year, $2,000
(§601)
3 years,
$100,000 (§181.3-401)
1 year, $2,000
(§53a-26)
(§53a-42)

(§823)

1 year, $2,300
(§4206)

(§22-3301)

1 year, $2,500
(§22-3301)
(§22-3571.01)
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Florida
(F.S.A.)

Georgia
(Ga. Code
Ann.)
Hawaii
(HRS)

Idaho
(I.C.)
Illinois
(ILCS)

Indiana
(IC)
Iowa
(I.C.A.)
Kansas
(K.S.A.)

IP AS VANDALISM

$300-$4,999
(§812.014)

5 years,
$5,000
(§775.082)
(§775.083)
$1500.015 years, min
$4,999
$1,000
(§16-8-12)
(§16-8-12)
$300.01
5 years,
(§708-831)
$10,000 +
$1,000 min
(§706-660)
(§706-640)
(§708-831)
$1,000.01 or
20 years,
more
$10,000
(§18-2407)
(§18-2408)
$500.015 years,
$10,000
$25,000 (720
(720 ILCS
ILCS 5/5-7.55/16-1)
40) (720
ILCS 5/5-4.550)
$750-$49,999
3 years,
(§35-43-4-2)
$10,000
(§35-50-2-7)
$1,000.015 years,
$10,000
$7,500
(§714.2)
(§902.9)
$1,000$100,000
$24,999
(§21-6611)
(§21-5801)
(§21-6804)

Kentucky
(KRS)

$500-$9,999
(§514.030)

Louisiana
(LSA-RS)

$1,500 or
more
(LSA-R.S.
§67)

Maine
(Title 32
M.R.S.A.)

$1,000.01$10,000
(§353)

5 years,
$10,000
(§532.020)
(§534.030)
10 years,
$3,000
(LSA-R.S.
§67)

5 years,
$5,000
(§1252)
(§1301)

$1,000.01 or
more
(§806.13)
More than
$500
(§16-7-23)
$1500.01
(§708-820)

$1,000.01 or
more
(§18-7001)
$300.01$10,000
(720 ILCS
5/21-1)

$750-$49,999
(§35-43-1-2)
$1,000.01$10,000
(§716.4)
$1,000$24,999
(§21-5813)
$1,000 or more
(§512.020)

5 years, $5,000
(§775.082)
(§860.13)
(§775.083)
5 years
(§16-7-22)
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(§810.09)

1 year, $1,000
(§775.082)
(§775.083)

$500 or less
(§16-7-21)

12 months,
$1,000
(§17-10-3)
1 year, $2,000
(§706-663)
(§706-640)

5 years,
$10,000 (§706660) (§706640)

(§708-813)

1 year, $1,000
(§08-7001)

(§18-7011)

3 years,
$25,000(720
ILCS 5/5-7.545) (720 ILCS
5/5-4.5-50)

(720 ILCS
5/21-3)

1 year, $5,000
(§35-50-3-2)

$750$49,999
(§35-43-2-2)
5 years, $7,500 $200.01 or
(§902.9)
more
(§716.8)
$100,000 (§21- (21-5808)
6611) (§216804)
5 years,
$10,000
(§532.020)
(§534.030)
2 years, $1,000
(LSA-R.S.
§14-56)

Simple
criminal
damage at
property $500$49,999
(LSA-R.S.
§14:56)
More than
5 years, $5,000
$2000
(§1252)
(§805)
(§1301)

(§511.060)

6 months,
$1,000
(§18-7011)
1 year, $2,500
(720 ILCS 5/54.5-55)

3 years,
$10,000(§3550-2-7)
1 year, $1,875
(§903.1)
6 months,
$1,000
(§21-6602)
(§21-6611)
1 year, $500
(§532.020)
(§534.040)

(LSA-R.S.
§63)

30 days, $500
(LSA-R.S. §63)

(§402)

1 year, $2,000
(§1252)
(§1301)
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Maryland
(MD Code,
Criminal Law)
Massachusetts
(M.G.L.A.)

$1,000$9,999
(§7-104)
More than
$250
(266 §30)

Michigan
(M.C.L.A.)

$1,000$19,999
(§750.356)

10 years,
$10,000
(§7-104)
5 years OR 2
years,
$25,000
(266 §30)

$1,000 or more 3 years, $2,500
(§6-301)
(§6-301)
(266 §127)

10 years, Or
the greater of
$3,000 or $3x
value AND 2.5
years
5 years, greater
of $10,000 or
3x value
(§750.377a)

5 years,
$1,000greater of
$19,999
$10,000 or 3x
(§750.377a)
value
(§750.356)
Minnesota
$1,000.015 years,
More than
5 years,
(M.S.A.)
$4,999
$10,000
$1,000
$10,000
(§609.52)
(§609.52)
(§609.595)
(§609.595)
Mississippi
$1,0005 years,
$1,000.015 years,
(Miss. Code
$4,999
$10,000
$4,999
$10,000 (§97Ann.)
(§97-17-41)
(§97-17-41)
(§97-17-67)
17-67)
Missouri
$500-$24,999
7 years,
Property
4 years, greater
(RSMo)
(§570.030)
greater of
Damage 1st
of $5,000 or 2x
$5,000 or 2x
Degree More
value
value
than $750
(§558.011)
(§570.030)
(§569.100)
(§569.100)
(§558.011)
(§560.011)
(§560.011)
Montana
More than
10 years,
More than
10 years,
(MCA)
$1,500
$50,000
$1,500
$50,000
(§45-6-301)
(§45-6-301)
(§45-6-101)
(§45-6-101)
Nebraska
More than
20 years,
$1,500 or more
5 years,
(Neb. Rev. St.)
$1,500
$25,000 (§28(§28-519)
$10,000
(§28-518)
105)
(§28-105)
Nevada
$650.015 years,
$250-$4,999
364 days,
(N.R.S.)142
$3,499
$10,000
(§206.330)
$2,000
(§205.222)
(§193.130)
(§193.140)

New
Hampshire
(N.H. Rev.
Stat)

More than
$1,500
(§637:11)

15 years,
$4,000
(§651:2)

More than
$1,500
(§634:2)

7 years, $4,000
(§651:2)
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(§6-402)

90 days, $500
(§6-402)

(266 § 120)

30 days, $100
(266 §120)

(§750.552)

30 days, $250
(§750.552)

(§609.605)

90 days, $1,000
(§609.03)

(§97-17-87)

6 months, $500
(§97-17-87)

(§569.140)

6 months, $500
(§558.011)
(§560.016)

($45-6-203)

6 months, $500
(§45-6-203)

(§28-520)

1 year, $1,000
(§28-106)

(§206.140)

Value of
damage, at least
6 months,
$1,000
(§206.140)
(§193.150)
7 years, $4,000
(§651:2)

More than
$1,500
(§635:2)

142. Nevada has separate statutes for theft and larceny; larceny statutes are cited herein.
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New Jersey
(N.J.S.A.)

$500.01$74,999
(§2C:20-2)
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5 years,
$2,000 or more
5 years,
(§2C:18-3)
18 months,
$15,000
(§2C:17-3)
$15,000
$10,000
(§2C:43-6)
(§2C:43-6)
(§2C:43-6)
(§2C:43-3)
(§2C:43-3)
(§2C:43-3)
New Mexico
$2,500.013 years,
More than
18 months,
Any damage
Double
(N.M.S.A.)
$25,000
$5,000
$1,000
$5,000
to property appraised value
(§30-16-1)
(§31-18-15)
(§30-15-1)
(§31-18-15)
(§30-14-1.1)
of damage
New York
More than
4 years
More than
7 years
(§140.15)
1 year, $1,000
(McKinney’s
$1,000
(§70.00) (no
$1,500
(§70.00) (no
(§70.15)
Penal Law)
(§155.30)
fine specified
(§145.10)
fine specified
(§80.00)
§80.00)
§80.00)
North Carolina
More than
8 years
Vandalism
6 months,
More than
1 year,
(N.C.G.S.A.)
$1,000
(§15Astatutes are
$1,000
$200
discretionary
(§14-72)
1340.17)
specific to
(§14-3)
(§14-160)
fine (§14-3)
fines appear
agriculture,
(§15A(§15A-1340.23)
to be
public
1340.23)
discretionary facilities, and
(§15A-1361
other unique
et seq.)
categories (e.g.
§14-132)
North Dakota $1,000.01 or
5 years,
$2,000.015 years,
(§12.1-22- 5 years, $10,000
(NDCC)
more
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
03)
(§12.0-32-01)
(§12.1-23-05) (§12.0-32-01) (§12.1-21-05) (§12.0-32-01)
Ohio (R.C.)
$1,0001 year,
$1,000 or more 1 year, $2,500 (§2911.21)
30 days, $250
$7,499
$2,500
(§2909.05)
(§2929.14)
(§2929.24)
(§2913.02)
(§2929.14)
(§2929.18)
(§2929.28)
(§2929.18)
(§2905.05)
Oklahoma
$500 or more
5 years,
$1,000 or more 2 years, $1,000
(§1835)
30 days, $500
(21 Okl. Stat.
(§1705)
$5,000
(§1760)
(§9)
(§1835)
Ann)
(§1705)
Oregon
$1,000 or
5 years,
$1,000.01 or
5 years,
(§164.255)
1 year, $6,250
(O.R.S.)
more
$125,000
more
$125,000
(§161.615)
(§164.055)
(§161.605)
(§164.365)
(§161.605)
(§161.635)
(§161.625)
(§161.625)
Pennsylvania $2,000.01 or
7 years,
$1000.012 years, $5,000
(§3503)
1 year, $2,500
(Pa.C.S.A.)
more
$15,000
$5,000
(§1103)
(§1103)
(§3903)
(§1103)
(§3304)
(§1101)
(§1101)
(§1101)
Rhode Island
$1,500.01 or
10 years,
(§11-44-1)
1 year, $1,000 (§11-44-26) 1 year, $1,000
(Gen. Laws)
more
$5,000 (§11(§11-44-1)
(§11-44-26)
(§11-41-5)
41-5)
South Carolina
$2,000.015 years,
$2,000.015 years,
(§16-1130 days, $100
(Code)
$9,999.99
mandatory
$9,999
mandatory
600)
(§16-11-520)
(§16-13-30) discretionary (§16-11-520)
discretionary
fine (§16-13fine
30)
(§16-11-520)
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South Dakota
(SDCL)
Tennessee
(T.C.A.)

Texas
(V.T.C.A.)
Utah
(U.C.A.)

Vermont
(V.S.A.)
Virginia
(VA Code
Ann.)

Washington
(RCWA)

West Virginia
(W.Va. Code)
Wisconsin
(W.S.A.)

Wyoming
(W.S.)
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$2,500.015 years,
$2,500.01$5,000
$10,000 (§22$5,000
(§22-30A-17)
6-1)
(§22-34-1)
$1,00012 years,
$1,000-$9,999
$9,999
$5,000 (§40- (§39-14-105)
(§39-14-105)
35-111)
$1,500$19,999
(§31.03)
$1,500$4,999
(§76-6-412)
$900.01 or
more
(§2501)
$5 or more
from the
person, $200
or more not
from the
person
(§18.2-95)
$750.01$5,000
(§9A.56.030)
$1,000 or
more
(§61-3-13)
$2,500.01$5,000
(§943.20)
$1,000 or
more
(§6-3-402)

2 years,
$10,000
(§12.35)
5 years,
$5,000 (§763-203)
(§76-3-301)
10 years,
$5,000
(§2501)
20 years,
$2,500
(§18.2-95)

5 years,
$10,000
(§9A.20.020)
10 years,
$2,500
(§61-3-13)
3 years & 6
months,
$10,000
(§939.50)
10 years,
$10,000 (§63-402)

5 years,
$10,000 (§226-1)
12 years,
$5,000 (§4035-111)

$1,500 2 years,
$19,999
$10,000
(§28.03)
(§12.35)
$1,500-$4,999 5 years, $5,000
(§76-6-106)
(§76-3-203)
(§76-3-301)
More than
5 years, $5,000
$1,000 (§3701)
(§3701)
$1,000 or more
(§18.2-137)

$750.01$5,000
(§9A.48.080)

5 years, OR 2
years and
$2,500 (§18.210)
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(§22-35-5)

1 year, $2,000
(§22-6-2)

(§39-14406)

6 months, $500
(§40-35-111)

(§30.05)

1 year, $4,000
(§12.21)

(§76-6-206)

1 year, $2,500
(§76-3-204)
(§76-3-301)

(§3705)

3 years, $2,000
(§3705)

(§18.2-121)

1 year,
$2,500(§18.211)

5 years,
(§9A.52.070
364 days,
$10,000
)
$5,000
(§43.06.230)
(§9.92.020)
(§9.92.010)
$2,500 or more
10 years,
(§61-3B-2) 12 months, $500
(§61-3-30)
$2,500 (§31-3(§61-3B-2)
30)
More than
3 years & 6
(§943.13)
9 months,
$2,500
months,
$10,000
(§943.01)
$10,000
(§939.51)
(§939.50)
$1,000 or more
10 years,
(§6-3-303) 6 months, $750
(§6-3-201)
$10,000
(§6-3-303)
(§6-3-201)

